According to Aristotle, we can possess Intellectual and Moral Virtues. The Moral Virtues are reflections of our emotional characteristics and are reflections of our character when our emotions are properly calibrated so that we feel the right way towards the right situations. Every emotional state can either be taken too far or not far enough and so each Moral Virtue lies somewhere between these two extremes – that is, each Moral Virtue lies between two Vices and to be virtuous we must find that balance.
In this discussion we will look at the Moral Virtues of Social Justice and Social Graces.
Social Justice has a lot of loaded connotations in the modern day, especially relating to particular trends in current politics and this should be distinguished from Aristotle’s conception of Social Justice. Aristotle’s conception might relate to the current arguments about Social Justice is a number of ways, but it should not be confused with them or be assumed to be the same thing.
Justice is an almost technical concept in Aristotle’s work and requires some unpacking.
First of all, Justice relates to how much of a good thing people receive when they undertake a common enterprise. Justice also relates to equality because someone who is Just will accept an equal share, whereas someone who is unjust will demand an unequal share. This point is worth stressing: it is the share of a good thing that leads to Justice, not the amount.
Let’s use an example to clarify this definition. Let’s say that two men build a house and that each man has built exactly half of the house – that is, both of the men have contributed the same amount to the building of the house. Therefore, Justice would require that both men receive half the amount of money for building the house and if both men are being Just, they would only demand half. However, let’s say that things were different. Instead of each man contributing half the work, one does almost all of the work whereas the other does hardly any. Now, if the money was split between them equally, the distribution would be unjust because the man who has done hardly any work does not deserve the same amount of money as the man who has done the most work. The two men deserve the same share. That means that, if every brick that is laid is worth £1, the man who lays 100 bricks deserves £100 and the man who lays 10 bricks only deserves £10. An unjust man would demand more than £10 when that is all he has earned and a just man would demand that he receives only what he has earned.
Using a more abstracted definition, this element of Justice can be defined by saying that Justice occurs when the ratio of distribution is equal; if one is to receive two units of value for every one unit of value they have put in, Justice demands that this ratio be the same for everyone.
Now, this is only the first of two kinds of Justice. The second kind is the kind of Justice that ensures that transactions do not result in new inequalities. This is a bit trickier to clarify but let’s say that once the house is built, the man with more money uses what he has earned to pay a thief to steal from the man with less money. This creates a new inequality in two ways: not only has the entire enterprise resulted in an inequality because now one man has a larger proportion of the share than he deserves (in the form of the stolen money from the second man) but now the two men are unequal in what could be called a lawful sense. Before anything was stolen, the two men might have had different amounts of money but they were equal in the lawful sense that whatever they had belonged to them and not to someone else. By stealing, the first man has infringed upon this equality because he determined that not only what is his belongs to him, but so does that which belongs to the other man too, whereas the other man does not enjoy the reverse privilege of owning all that the first man owns. Therefore, Justice would decree that this situation is corrected and that the equality is re-established, even by means of compensation if necessary.
The bottom line is that, in both kinds of Justice, the outcome of a common enterprise ensures that there has neither been an unfair gain nor an unfair loss. No matter how many people are involved, if someone either has more than is fair or less, this would be a case of injustice.
Moreover, if you are the kind of person who deliberately seeks to benefit from some kind of unjust, unfair arrangement, that makes you an unjust and wicked person. Yet, you can choose to give up some of your fair share and this would not be unjust. If the builder who has earned £100 decides to give £10 to the other builder this would not be unjust. Why is this? Because the man who has given away his £10 has done so freely and he has not been treated unjustly against his will. We can therefore conclude that Justice and Injustice involve matters of autonomy and injustice is done when it is done against someone’s Will. Aristotle argued, for this reason, that people cannot be unjust to themselves but are only able to treat other people unjustly. People can treat themselves unjustly, but this is only in a metaphorical sense – this is the sense is which we can do ourselves an injustice internally when we let the inferior parts of our being take priority over the superior parts. This is an important point regarding moral character, but it is not to be dealt upon for the present discussion.
Now, of course, we have been discussing Social Justice and Justice does relate to society at large. This is because Justice deals with people who undertake a common enterprise (such as building a house together) and Aristotle points out that the biggest common enterprise is society itself. We are all in the common enterprise of allowing society to function whether we know it or not; by studying, by working, by paying our taxes, by doing things with our friends and family. We are all in a large, interconnected system in which Justice is required to determine who gets what for what they do. The problem, of course, is that this is enormously complicated and Aristotle recognises this. He has presented some general principles but these principles might need to be applied in some very unique ways to a myriad of different situations; how do we measure value? Is it the same in business as in an intimate relationship? How do we measure effort or value created? Is this the same on a battlefield as in a hospital? Who really deserves what, and how can we tell? These are the kinds of questions of Social Justice that Aristotle has only provided a framework for answering as he advises that the principles of law should be applied in a flexible way to the complexities of life.
Now we can turn to Social Graces.
Social Graces are things like our capacity to be friendly or witty. At first Aristotle simply saw these as attributes that simply make someone likeable but saw no reason to elevate these attributes to the status of Moral Virtues. However, Aristotle eventually changed his conclusion about this and saw the Social Graces as potential Moral Virtues if they were consciously motivated. Someone might simply be born as a naturally friendly person – this would not be a Moral Virtue, but if that same person or someone else tried to consciously cultivate their friendliness, then it would be a Moral Virtue.
When it comes to Moral Virtue, each of the Social Graces can be treated as one on its own, and
as such, each Social Grace has its own Virtue-spectrum. If we take friendliness again for example, Aristotle would argue that it – like the other Virtues – can either be taken too far or not far enough, with the Virtuous state being somewhere in between the two extremes; someone can be too friendly and obliging or they might not be friendly enough. Likewise, someone can either not be witty enough or they might tend to use their wit too much.
In any case, Aristotle advises balance with the Social Graces and it seems that their goal is to
make you generally likeable (without compromising your principles of course), with the optimum balance being where the Grace is most effective at this. What this means is that there is a sweet spot to an attribute like friendliness where you can be friendly enough that you become as likeable as possible without compromising your self-esteem or your principles – this is the point at which you could be said to have the Virtue of friendliness.
The same rule applies for the other Social Graces. Not all of them are listed in the material, but along with friendliness and wittiness we might put things like politeness and hospitality. The rule is always the same: these Graces can be taken too far towards either extreme which renders them as Vices, but if we find the right balance that allows these Graces to make us as friendly as possible without compromising our integrity, we can be said to possess them as Virtues.