If we are to seek the truth and know what it is, considerations of what is logical and what is useful are fundamental to our enquiry. In previous discussions, both of these approaches to truth have been unpacked; we have explored why adherence to logic is necessary and we have also explored why use must be a measure of truth (or why truth is measured in relation to what we are trying to achieve – our goals). Moreover, the limits of both of these approaches has been outlined. If either of these approaches to truth is taken on its own, the approach appears to be ultimately unsupported and unjustified. However, what has also been mentioned is that the problems that each approach has can be solved by an appeal to the other. That is, logic is supported by an appeal to use, and use is supported by an appeal to logic. Thereby, both elements to truth-seeking are not only necessary in their own right, but necessary as a pair. If we are to have a heuristic – a tool for seeking the truth, it is therefore necessary that this heuristic makes an appeal to what is logical and useful, from which all else can follow.
In this discussion, the aim will be to explicitly address the issues of logic and use… if we consider all of the discussions that have been had thus far, the importance of both of these approaches have been explained, as have their problems. Likewise, the solutions to these problems have been mentioned. The aim here is to explain each of these solutions, and in so doing, the necessary relationship between what we regard as logical and what we regard as useful will hopefully be established.
Let’s begin with logic.
To recap, logic is necessary for seeking the truth because without consistency (which logic tracks), things become meaningless and senseless and any claims that we attempt to make about the truth will collapse under their own weight. However, the problem with using logic as the sole, initial measure of truth is that it begs the question; the proofs that demonstrate that logic must be adherend to assume logic to begin with. We can therefore ask what justifies logic beyond itself. Likewise, the problem is compounded when we recognise that logic cannot demonstrate its own value; the principles of logic alone cannot tell use why logic should be adopted. Therefore, we may consider whether it is necessary for our truth-seeking efforts or whether the adherence to logic is merely a preference.
How are we to solve this problem?
Well, we already appear to have the outline of the solution within the problem itself: without logic, things are meaningless and senseless – it practically places us within a position of intellectual chaos. The adherence to logic may be a preference, but it is not merely a preference; it is a necessary preference if we ever want to make sense of truth in any meaningful way. Moreover, we find that this does not only apply to “truth” as it is abstracted and conceptualised; practical interaction with “The Truth” or “Reality” or “The World” or whatever we might deem to call it become senseless unless we approach them in a logical manner. Given what logic fundamentally is, practically approaching life in a logical manner does not require that we dissect and analyse everything to the nth degree but it does require that, at a minimum, we recognise that there is a way that things are; things are consistent with their own identity (even if we are trying to figure out exactly what that identity is). Being true to their own identities, things must be consistent with themselves. If we ever reach a point where contradictions do occur and things apparently are not what they are, we can safely presume that we are being faced with a falsehood – with un-truth in some respect and that we may need to correct our understanding of the truth. We must take this approach; we must regard truth as logical and consistent if we want things to make any sense and the same is true whether we are trying to understand a theory of economics or whether we are trying to build a house.
Where is the place for “use” in this solution, then?
To regard “use as the measure of truth” is to regard truth by its ability in helping us to achieve our goals. Therefore, to make the connection explicit: the desire for things to make any sense is a goal. If we don’t have that goal to begin with, logic remains unjustified and there is no reason to adhere to it. Therefore, use tethers adherence to logic because use becomes the measure of truth: it is our goals for things to make sense that justifies logic and gives it its truth-value; logic becomes measured by its ability to allow us to make sense of things. Therefore, if we are to pursue an understanding of the truth that makes sense, logic is necessarily entailed.
And so, use tethers logic. But what about regarding use as the measure of truth? What about the problems that this approach poses?
Again, to recap from a previous discussion, if use is the measure of truth this begs the question because nothing can justify a given goal and, therefore, the given parameters for what is true beyond the fact that it happens to be the given goal. However, all information that could have an effect contrary to the goal becomes irrelevant and has no truth-value because truth becomes relative to our goals and what we deem to be useful or not. Therefore, if we can arbitrarily change our goals, we can arbitrarily change the truth.
How do we answer this set of problems?
Previously, two solutions were proposed:
1. By appealing to the Laws of Thought, and
2. By positing a goal that does not change.
These two solutions are both related to tethering use in logic, but before this becomes clear, let’s consider each solution in turn.
Let’s begin with an appeal to the Laws of Thought…
To say that our measure of truth depends on what goals we are trying to pursue means that the truth changes with our aims. Thereby, truth becomes relative to a given time or context and the given goals that these entail, whether that be for an individual or on a societal level. However, the Laws of Thought stay constant.
What does this mean?
Well, let’s take the first law: The Law of Identity…
What does it mean to posit that this does not change, regardless of time, context, and the aims therein?
It simply means that it doesn’t make sense to claim that the Law of Identity could ever be broken if anything were to ever make sense. The law is, for example, required for us to make the claim that 2+2=4. That is because if 2 is in fact 2 it is, by definition, half of 4, and so when we put two lots of two together… in any case, it remains that the first law must have been constant and invoked whenever this claim was to be made. For example, what sense is there in claim that you aim to demonstrate that 2+2=5 if 2 is, in fact, 2? This would be senseless and therefore the goal itself would be senseless.
This appears to demonstrate that, although some of our goals might change, the means to achieving them may not. Therefore, it could be the case that one aims for things to be senseless, in which case the Laws of Thought are irrelevant… however, if the goal is for things to make sense, the Laws of Thought are always there to ensure that potential. And don’t forget what else this applies to. We considered maths in this example, but the relevance of this example applies to all other areas. Indeed, in a previous discussion it was demonstrated that without an adherence to the Law of Identity we would struggle to do something as simple as make a cup of tea. And so, if we zoom-out and apply this across time and context we could consider how a Roman general may command his troops if a legion is not, in fact, a legion, or how a medieval Russian peasant might bake their loaves of bread if bread is not, in fact, bread (even if it is called by different name)… even the Chinese sage must assume that the Tao is, in fact, the Tao in order to meditate on it, even if he cannot every truly state what it is.
And so, an appeal to The Laws of Thought appears to present a solution to the problem of using use as the measure of truth by allowing us to see that our goals may be relative, but their solutions may not. Therefore, if truth is measured by its ability to help us to attain our goals, this cannot be merely relative because it cannot be the case that anything will allow for a goal to be achieved. That is to say, some solutions are not relative, with logic being the case in point. Yet, the importance of the example of logic goes further because the logical axiom that things are consistent with their identities carries over across all goals that first require that things make sense. Therefore, if the requirement is constant across goals, adherence to logic is constant and the adoption of logic cannot be relative to time and context. Therefore, regardless of our goals and of time and of context, logic must always factor into our understanding of what is or is not true. This is also why we cannot simply choose our goals arbitrarily; if we want things to make sense, logic forces us to adopt some goals and exclude others.
This is, of course, with one possible exception: those cases in which it is useful to be illogical. What should we make of such cases? After all, if use is the measure of truth and it is useful to be illogical, is not truth then illogical? And if so, does this not contradict all that has been said of logic and its place in truth-seeking thus far?
The answer is that, under such an approach to truth, being measured by its use, the truth can be illogical, but it cannot also make any sense. This is precisely why use cannot be a lone measure of truth and must be tethered to logic if we are to understand a truth that makes any sense.
In fact, this brings us to the second solution: to posit a goal that does not change.
The rationale for this solution is borne of the recognition that truth is apparently relative to our goals and therefore, that there may be as many varieties of “truth” as there are goals to be pursued.
However, that is only if we assume that goals are isolated and that there are no common criteria to them. It is the criteria that determines whether a goal can be achieved or not and, therefore, whether our understanding of the truth does or does not assist in achieving it. Therefore, if use is the measure of truth, and the criteria for what constitutes “use” is constant, it follows that truth would be, in some measure, constant; not relative, but always tethered to these criteria.
By this point it should therefore be no surprise to discover that we can carry the argument over from the previous solution and posit that this goal or criterion that always remains constant in that things need to make sense.
If this criterion is always present in our goals, it must mean that we are always tethered to adhere to logic, at least to some degree. If at any point we forego logic, we can posit goals that don’t require anything to make any sense in order to be pursued, but it is difficult to image such a goal, to say nothing of our ability to carry it out. For example, imagine trying to achieve the goal of picking up a rock whilst having abandonment of logic as one of your criteria. As basic logic what allows for the recognition that – say – a rock is a rock we might wonder how one could ever know that this end has, in fact, been reached. In simpler terms, we could posit that the goal is to get from A to B, but because logic is what determines that B is – in fact – B, how would you know that B has ever been reached? Therefore, logic tethers our goals in at least two ways: by functioning as a consistent criterion underneath our goals and by allowing us to posit goals that can be intelligibly pursued. Once the need for things to make sense is recognised as a constant, use may be the measure of truth but this cannot be relative because what can or cannot be deemed as “useful” must be constrained by logic to what can or cannot make sense.
As an aside, one thing that I need to take care with is with the possible implication that insanity can be defined out of existence. With the argument that I’ve just made, along with others that have been given, it would appear that people can never be illogical. But we see that people can be insane, and so what are we to make of this? The short answer is that we seem unable to put being purely illogical into practice. We can be illogical at times, but these appear to be exceptions that stifle and confuse our efforts. In any case, this is a digression that may or may not be explored further at a later date.
What has hopefully been explained by this juncture is the rationale behind the respective solutions to the problems of logic (through an appeal to use) and to the problems of use (through an appeal to logic) …
Logic may beg the question of its ultimate justification, but we can solve this with an appeal that goes beyond logic itself and argue that logic is justified because without an adherence to it, we cannot achieve our goals. That is to say, it is the use of logic that justifies our adherence to it and justifies it as a measure of truth. This includes the goal of understanding the truth itself. Regarding use as the primary measure of truth on the other hand can beg the question once again and render our standards of truth arbitrary. The problem is solved with two appeals to logic which, taken together, can be condensed into the argument that we have a need to assume logic if our goals are ever to be achieved or even to be intelligible. The Laws of Thought never change and, as such, the basic, logical criterion for our goals remains constant across time and context.
Therefore, an appeal to both logic and use is necessary for us to seek the truth because without either the pursuit of truth becomes unintelligible and so we must make an appeal to both as initial measures of truth. Yet, again, if either is taken alone, the justification for either falls apart. The solution, then, is to appeal to both at once; it is hard to say which is more primary (if this is even possible) but taken together, an appeal to logic and use allows for correction in the flaws left open by the other. Therefore, one may not be primary, but taken together they form a dyad or a mutually supporting bond resting at the foundation of our truth-seeking efforts.
Naturally, as questions begin to be answered, more begin to be raised. For example, we may recognise that this picture accounts for how we do aim for particular things but does not (as of yet) say what we should aim for. This is an important question, but it seems to me that it, along with many others, can be built up to from this foundation.
In the meantime, confident in the reasoning underpinning this argument, it may be time to clean it up and condense it, ready to make the case for how we would utilise a basic truth-seeking heuristic.